BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//128.220.36.25//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.26.9// CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-FROM-URL:https://www.clsp.jhu.edu X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RDATE:20241103T020000 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T020000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RDATE:20250309T020000 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-21494@www.clsp.jhu.edu DTSTAMP:20240328T181058Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Student Seminars CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:Abstract\nAdversarial attacks deceive neural network systems by adding carefully crafted perturbations to benign signals. Being almost im perceptible to humans\, these attacks pose a severe security threat to the state-of-the-art speech and speaker recognition systems\, making it vital to propose countermeasures against them. In this talk\, we focus on 1) cl assification of a given adversarial attack into attack algorithm type\, th reat model type\, and signal-to-adversarial-noise ratios\, 2) developing a novel speech denoising solution to further improve the classification per formance. \nOur proposed approach uses an x-vector network as a signature extractor to get embeddings\, which we call signatures. These signatures c ontain information about the attack and can help classify different attack algorithms\, threat models\, and signal-to-adversarial-noise ratios. We d emonstrate the transferability of such signatures to other tasks. In parti cular\, a signature extractor trained to classify attacks against speaker identification can also be used to classify attacks against speaker verifi cation and speech recognition. We also show that signatures can be used to detect unknown attacks i.e. attacks not included during training. Lastly \, we propose to improve the signature extractor by making the job of the signature extractor easier by removing the clean signal from the adversari al example (which consists of clean signal+perturbation). We train our sig nature extractor using adversarial perturbation. At inference time\, we us e a time-domain denoiser to obtain adversarial perturbation from adversari al examples. Using our improved approach\, we show that common attacks in the literature (Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)\, Projected Gradient Desc ent (PGD)\, Carlini-Wagner (CW) ) can be classified with accuracy as high as 96%. We also detect unknown attacks with an equal error rate (EER) of a bout 9%\, which is very promising. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220304T120000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220304T131500 LOCATION:Ames Hall 234 @ 3400 N. Charles Street\, Baltimore\, MD 21218 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Student Seminar – Sonal Joshi “Classify and Detect Adversarial Atta cks Against Speaker and Speech Recognition Systems” URL:https://www.clsp.jhu.edu/events/student-seminar-sonal-joshi/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n
\\nAbstr act
\nAdversarial attacks deceive neural network systems by adding carefully crafted perturbations to benign signals. Being almost imperceptible to humans\, these attacks pose a severe security thr eat to the state-of-the-art speech and speaker recognition systems\, makin g it vital to propose countermeasures against them. In this talk\, we focu s on 1) classification of a given adversarial attack into attack algorithm type\, threat model type\, and signal-to-adversarial-noise ratios\, 2) de veloping a novel speech denoising solution to further improve the classifi cation performance.
\nOur proposed approach uses a n x-vector network as a signature extractor to get embeddings\, which we c all signatures. These signatures contain information about the attack and can help classify different attack algorithms\, threat models\, and signal -to-adversarial-noise ratios. We demonstrate the transferability of such s ignatures to other tasks. In particular\, a signature extractor trained to classify attacks against speaker identification can also be used to class ify attacks against speaker verification and speech recognition. We also s how that signatures can be used to detect unknown attacks i.e. attacks not included during training. Lastly\, we propose to improve the signature e xtractor by making the job of the signature extractor easier by removing t he clean signal from the adversarial example (which consists of clean sign al+perturbation). We train our signature extractor using adversarial pertu rbation. At inference time\, we use a time-domain denoiser to obtain adver sarial perturbation from adversarial examples. Using our improved approach \, we show that common attacks in the literature (Fast Gradient Sign Metho d (FGSM)\, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)\, Carlini-Wagner (CW) ) can be classified with accuracy as high as 96%. We also detect unknown attacks w ith an equal error rate (EER) of about 9%\, which is very promising.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:2022\,Joshi\,March END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT UID:ai1ec-22422@www.clsp.jhu.edu DTSTAMP:20240328T181058Z CATEGORIES;LANGUAGE=en-US:Seminars CONTACT: DESCRIPTION:Abstract\nZipf’s law is commonly glossed by the aphorism “infre quent words are frequent\,” but in practice\, it has often meant that ther e are three types of words: frequent\, infrequent\, and out-of-vocabulary (OOV). Speech recognition solved the problem of frequent words in 1970 (wi th dynamic time warping). Hidden Markov models worked well for moderately infrequent words\, but the problem of OOV words was not solved until sequ ence-to-sequence neural nets de-reified the concept of a word. Many other social phenomena follow power-law distributions. The number of native sp eakers of the N’th most spoken language\, for example\, is 1.44 billion ov er N to the 1.09. In languages with sufficient data\, we have shown that monolingual pre-training outperforms multilingual pre-training. In less-f requent languages\, multilingual knowledge transfer can significantly redu ce phone error rates. In languages with no training data\, unsupervised A SR methods can be proven to converge\, as long as the eigenvalues of the l anguage model are sufficiently well separated to be measurable. Other syst ems of social categorization may follow similar power-law distributions. Disability\, for example\, can cause speech patterns that were never seen in the training database\, but not all disabilities need do so. The inabi lity of speech technology to work for people with even common disabilities is probably caused by a lack of data\, and can probably be solved by find ing better modes of interaction between technology researchers and the com munities served by technology.\nBiography\nMark Hasegawa-Johnson is a Will iam L. Everitt Faculty Fellow of Electrical and Computer Engineering at th e University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign. He has published research i n speech production and perception\, source separation\, voice conversion\ , and low-resource automatic speech recognition. DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221209T120000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221209T131500 LOCATION:Hackerman Hall B17 @ 3400 N. Charles Street\, Baltimore\, MD 21218 SEQUENCE:0 SUMMARY:Mark Hasegawa-Johnson (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) “Zi pf’s Law Suggests a Three-Pronged Approach to Inclusive Speech Recognition ” URL:https://www.clsp.jhu.edu/events/mark-hasegawa-johnson-university-of-ill inois-urbana-champaign/ X-COST-TYPE:free X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\\n\\n\\nAbstr act
\nZipf’s law is commonly glossed by the aphorism “infre quent words are frequent\,” but in practice\, it has often meant that ther e are three types of words: frequent\, infrequent\, and out-of-vocabulary (OOV). Speech recognition solved the problem of frequent words in 1970 (wi th dynamic time warping). Hidden Markov models worked well for moderately infrequent words\, but the problem of OOV words was not solved until sequ ence-to-sequence neural nets de-reified the concept of a word. Many other social phenomena follow power-law distributions. The number of native sp eakers of the N’th most spoken language\, for example\, is 1.44 billion ov er N to the 1.09. In languages with sufficient data\, we have shown that monolingual pre-training outperforms multilingual pre-training. In less-f requent languages\, multilingual knowledge transfer can significantly redu ce phone error rates. In languages with no training data\, unsupervised A SR methods can be proven to converge\, as long as the eigenvalues of the l anguage model are sufficiently well separated to be measurable. Other syst ems of social categorization may follow similar power-law distributions. Disability\, for example\, can cause speech patterns that were never seen in the training database\, but not all disabilities need do so. The inabi lity of speech technology to work for people with even common disabilities is probably caused by a lack of data\, and can probably be solved by find ing better modes of interaction between technology researchers and the com munities served by technology.
\nBiography
\nMark Hasegawa-Johnson is a William L. Everitt Faculty Fellow of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaig n. He has published research in speech production and perception\, source separation\, voice conversion\, and low-resource automatic speech recogni tion.
\n X-TAGS;LANGUAGE=en-US:2022\,December\,Hasegawa-Johnson END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR